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Rational land and housing bubbles
in infinite-horizon economies⇤
Stefano BOSI† Cuong LE VAN‡ Ngoc-Sang PHAM§
February 13, 2016
Abstract
This paper considers rational land and housing bubbles in an infinite-horizon general
equilibrium model. Their demands rest on two di↵erent grounds: the land is an input
to produce while the house may be consumed.
Our work di↵ers from the existing literature in two respects. First, dividends on
both these long-lived assets are endogenous and their sequences are computed. Second,
we introduce and study di↵erent concepts of bubbles, including individual and strong
bubbles.
Keywords: infinite horizon, general equilibrium, land bubble, housing bubble.
JEL classification: C62, D51, D9, G13.
1 Introduction
The existence of rational bubbles in general equilibrium model is a challenging issue since the
early Eighties. Thinking bubbles in (dynamic) general equilibrium becomes indispensable to
understand the real e↵ects of financial crises. A general equilibrium approach captures the
interplay between (financial and real) markets. If the issue of rational bubbles was initially
raised in the OLG models, today it is mostly addressed in infinite-horizon intertemporal
models.
Our paper is part of this recent literature and focuses on rational bubbles of specific
long-lived assets, land and houses.
The conventional definition of asset bubble is the positive di↵erence between equilibrium
price and fundamental value. In general equilibrium models, price and fundamental value
are endogenous, and the bubble as well. The equilibrium price is observed and determined
by market clearing conditions, while the fundamental value depends on the definition of
discounting and returns. Di↵erent definitions of fundamental value exist in literature.
The novelty of our paper is twofold.
(1) Land and houses are emblematic assets representing two alternative fundamental
pricing mechanisms (land is used to produce good, and house is consumed and gives utility).
⇤The authors are very grateful to an anonymous referee useful remarks, comments, suggestions. They
have helped us to substantially improve our previous version.
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The proofs of equilibrium existence are routine. Nevertheless, while most of the infinite-
horizon models introduce exogenous sequence of dividends (for mathematical tractability),
we compute instead endogenous dividends.
(2) We provide three di↵erent notions of bubble: the conventional one, of course, but
also new definitions (individual and strong). We compare them to shed light on the financial
underworld (assets) and its consequences on the real world (goods).
We focus first on a long-lived productive asset. Agents buy land today to produce a
consumption good and resell it tomorrow. Any agent is consumer and producer at the same
time and technology is supposed to be landowner-specific. One unit of land produces a no
longer exogenous amount of consumption good. Our contribution rests on the concept of
dividend of land denoted by dt and endogenously determined by the following asset-pricing
equation:
qt
pt
=  t+1
✓
qt+1
pt+1
+ dt+1
◆
where pt and qt are the prices of consumption good and land at date t and  t+1 is the
endogenous discount factor of the economy from date t to date t+ 1.
We show that the land dividend lies between the lowest and the highest marginal pro-
ductivities. The fundamental value of land at date 0 denoted by FV0 is defined as a sum of
discounted values of land dividends: FV0 :=
P1
t=1Qtdt where Qt :=  1 · · ·  t is the discount
factor of the economy from the initial date to date t. We will show that the price of land
consists of two parts. First, the reselling price of one unit of land. Second, the fundamental
value, that is what one unit of land delivers in terms of dividend. A land bubble is said to
exist when the equilibrium price of land (in consumption good units) exceeds its fundamental
value: q0/p0 > FV0.
A particular case of our productive asset is when every agents share the same and linear
technology. In this case, one unit purchased at each date delivers an exogenous amount of
consumption good (a real dividend) at the next date. This asset is studied by Tirole (1982),
Kocherlakota (1992) and Santos and Woodford (1997). The definition of fundamental value
of the asset with exogenous dividends is just the sum (over time) of discounted values of
dividends. When dividends are nil, the fundamental value of the asset is zero; this zero-
dividend asset is studied by Tirole (1985) in OLG frameworks and by Aoki et al. (2014),
Hirano and Yanagawa (2013) in infinite-horizon models.
Revisiting the notion of discounting, we introduce a new concept of bubble based on
individual preferences. Formally, an i - bubble rests on the individual asset-pricing equation:
qt
pt
=  i,t+1
✓
qt+1
pt+1
+ di,t+1
◆
where  i,t+1 is the endogenous discount factor of agent i from date t to date t+1, and di,t+1
is her individual dividend at date t + 1. In this case, the individual fundamental value of
land expected by agent i is FVi :=
P1
t=1Qi,tdi,t where Qi,t :=  i,1 · · ·  i,t. As above, an i
- bubble exists if q0/p0 > FVi. We also say that strong bubble exists if q0/p0 > maxi FVi
meaning that the land price is strictly higher than every individual fundamental value.
From these definitions, number of results come. First, there exists an agent i such that
her expected fundamental value of land equals its equilibrium price: FVi = q0/p0, that is,
the i - bubble is ruled out. Indeed, when an agent expects a fundamental value of land less
than its price, she does not buy land in the long run. At equilibrium, this is not the case for
any agent, otherwise the land market clearing condition fails. Most importantly, this result
implies the impossibility of strong bubbles, i.e. q0/p0 = maxi FVi. Second, the ratio Qt/Qi,t
is uniformly bounded from above for any i, then, there is no room for land bubbles. In
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particular, if the agents’ discount factors are identical, bubbles are ruled out; by the way, we
recover Le Van and Pham (2014). Third, the agents’ expected fundamental values are not less
than the fundamental value of land. Moreover, when any individual value of land coincides
with its fundamental value, both bubbles and i - bubbles are ruled out. To illustrate this
theory and the occurrence of land bubbles, we give an example where endowments fluctuate
and agents’ TFPs converge to zero. Indeed, agents concerned by a drop in endowments
tomorrow buy land today at a higher price in order to smooth their consumption over time.
This price is independent on their technologies. We show that when the agent’s TFP goes
to zero, the fundamental value of land tends to zero as well. By consequence, land bubbles
arise.
While land assets and bubbles are valued on the production side, other assets and bubbles
may be valued on the consumption side. In the second part of the article, we focus on a
leading example: the housing bubbles. Houses are goods that yield utility. An agent buys a
house today to enjoy its services, and may resell it tomorrow. Thus, di↵erently from land,
the house enters the utility function of its owner. Its marginal utility represents a sort of
housing dividend. Most of the results for land bubbles still hold for housing bubbles. A
constructive example complements the theory: as above, fluctuations in agents’ endowments
jointly with a housing preference rate which tends to zero, promote a bubbly equilibrium.
Our paper contribute to the existing literature on asset price bubble, in particular on
bubbles of assets delivering endogenous dividends.1 Among others, two approaches deserve
mention.
(1) Miao and Wang (2012, 2015) consider bubbles of firm values with endogenous divi-
dends. They divide in two parts the value V (K) of a firm endowed with K units of initial
capital: V (K) = QK + B, where Q represents an endogenous Tobin’s Q (marginal). They
interpret QK and B as fundamental value (of the firm) and bubble, respectively.
(2) Becker et al. (2015) introduce instead the concept of physical capital bubble. In this
case, the fundamental value of physical capital is the sum of discounted values of capital
returns (after depreciation) and physical capital bubbles occurs when the equilibrium price
of physical capital exceeds this fundamental value. In our model, land behaves as physical
capital and is used to produce a consumption good. However, in Becker et al. (2015), the
good is produced by a representative firm, while, in our model, any agent can be viewed as
a producer and, therefore, there are as many producers as agents.
Bosi et al (2015a) introduce concepts of bubbles in aggregate and capital goods. They
then show how these two kinds of goods generate di↵erent bubbles: a bubble in aggregate
good may exist even if (1) the present value of output is finite, (2) all consumers are identical,
(3) borrowing constraints of consumers are never binding. By contrast, bubbles in capital
good2 are ruled out if one of three conditions is violated.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and provides
some preliminary equilibrium properties. Sections 3 and 4 study land and housing bubbles
respectively. Section 5 presents an alternative unified model. Section 6 concludes. All the
formal proofs are gathered in Appendices 7 and 8.
1The reader is referred to Miao (2014) for an introduction to bubbles in infinite-horizon models. Brun-
nermeier and Oehmke (2012) is a good survey on bubbles in OLG models with asymmetric information or
heterogeneous belief.
2A particular case of bubbles in capital good is that of bubbles in asset with exogenous dividends as in
Kocherlakota (1992), Santos and Woodford (1997), Huang and Werner (2000) and Le Van and Pham (2014).
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2 Fundamentals and equilibrium existence
We consider a discrete-time general equilibrium model without uncertainty. The economy
starts at time t = 0 and goes on forever. There are two markets, one for consumption
good and the other for land. A set I of m infinite-lived heterogeneous agents own the land,
produce, exchange and consume.
Consumption good. At any date t, the ith agent is endowed with ei,t of consumption
good. Facing a price pt, she decides to consume ci,t units of this good.
Land. The aggregate endowment of land is constant over time and equal to L. At
the date t, the ith agent buys li,t+1 units of land at a price qt in order to produce Fi,t(li,t+1)
units of consumption good. Technology is non-stationary and Fi,t is a time-dependent agent-
specific production function. When the production is over, the same agent may resell this
amount of land at a price qt+1. Land allows agents to transfer their wealth over time.
At date 0, taking the sequence of prices (p, q) = (pt, qt)1t=0 as given, the infinite-lived
agent chooses the sequence of consumption and land (ci, li) := (ci,t, li,t+1)1t=0 to maximize her
intertemporal utility. The program writes:
Pi(p, q) : max
1X
t=0
 tiui(ci,t) (1)
subject to : li,t+1   0
ptci,t + qtli,t+1  ptei,t + qtli,t + ptFi,t(li,t)
for any t   0. The initial endowment of land li,0 > 0 is given.
There are no financial markets. This assumption prevents agents from borrowing.
Definition 1. A sequence of prices and quantities
 
p¯t, q¯t, (c¯i,t, l¯i,t+1)mi=1
 1
t=0
is an equilibrium
of the economy without financial market if the following conditions are satisfied.
(i) Price positivity: p¯t, q¯t > 0 for any t   0.
(ii) Market clearing conditions:
mX
i=1
c¯i,t =
mX
i=1
⇥
ei,t + Fi,t(l¯i,t)
⇤
and
mX
i=1
l¯i,t = L
for any t.
(iii) Agents’ optimality: (c¯i,t, l¯i,t+1)1t=0 is a solution of the problem Pi(p¯, q¯) for any i.
In the sequel, we denote for simplicity the equilibrium sequence by (p, q, (ci, li)mi=1). The
economy, denoted by E , is identified by a list of fundamentals: E := (Fi, ui,  i, ei, li,0).
As seen above, unavailability of financial assets prevents agents from borrowing. Other
authors allow agents to borrow: Bosi et al. (2015b) is an example of economy with land
bubbles where imperfect financial markets take place.
If Fi(x) = ⇠tx for every i, where (⇠t) is an exogenous sequence of returns, land becomes
an asset as in Kocherlakota (1992), Santos and Woodford (1997) and Huang and Werner
(2000), or looks like a Lucas’ tree. If Fi = 0 for every i, land becomes a pure bubble as in
Tirole (1985). In this case, the fundamental value is zero.
The existence of a competitive equilibrium is ensured by some mild assumptions on
technology and preferences, namely the positivity of endowments, the concavity of production
and utility functions, and the boundedness of intertemporal utility in the set of feasible
consumption sequences.
4
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Assumption 1. For any i and t, the function Fi,t is concave and continuously di↵erentiable
with Fi,t(0) = 0 and F 0i,t > 0.
Assumption 2. li,0 > 0 for any i and ei,t > 0 for any i and t.
Assumption 3. For any i, the function ui is continuously di↵erentiable and concave with
u0i(0) =1 and u0i (x) > 0 if x > 0.
Assumption 4.
P1
t=0  
t
iui(Wt) < 1 for any i, where Wt :=
Pm
i=1 [ei,t + Fi,t(L)] is the
maximum amount of consumption available at time t.
A standard proof of equilibrium existence is given in Appendix 8.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 to 4, there exists an equilibrium for the economy E .
3 Land bubbles
The definition of bubble rests on the notion of fundamental value which depends on discount-
ing in turn. The first-order conditions of programs Pi(p, q) allow us to define the equilibrium
discount factors as follows.
Let
⇣
p, q, (ci, li)mi=1
⌘
be an equilibrium for the economy E . Denote by  i,t and µi,t+1 the
ith agent’s multipliers with respect to the budget constraint and the borrowing constraint
li,t+1   0, respectively. The first-order conditions write:
 tiu
0
i(ci,t) =  i,tpt (2)
 i,tqt =  i,t+1
⇥
qt+1 + pt+1F
0
i,t+1(li,t+1)
⇤
+ µi,t+1
jointly with the slackness condition µi,t+1li,t+1 = 0.
Asset pricing rests on no-arbitrage conditions:
qt
pt
=
 iu0i(ci,t+1)
u0i(ci,t)

qt+1
pt+1
+ F 0i,t+1(li,t+1) +
µi,t+1
 i,t+1pt+1
 
(3)
We introduce the discount factors for individuals and economy.
 i,t+1 :=
 iu0i(ci,t+1)
u0i(ci,t)
and  t+1 := max
i2I
 iu0i(ci,t+1)
u0i(ci,t)
are, respectively, the individual discount factor and the discount factor of the economy from
date t to date t + 1. We then define the individual discount factor and the discount factor
of the economy from date 0 to date t:
Qi,t :=  i,1 . . .  i,t and Qt :=  1 . . .  t
with Qi,0 := Q0 := 1.
We now define the lowest and the highest productivities:
dt := min
i2I
F 0i,t(li,t) and d¯t := max
i2I
F 0i,t(li,t)
5
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3.1 Fundamental value of land and land bubbles
Asset pricing and productivity bounds are closely related through condition (3).
Lemma 1. The relative price of land is bounded as follows:
 t+1
✓
qt+1
pt+1
+ dt+1
◆
 qt
pt
  t+1
✓
qt+1
pt+1
+ d¯t+1
◆
(4)
The introduction of land dividends allows us to define the land bubbles.
Definition 2 (dividends of land). A land dividend dt+1 at date t+1 satisfies a no-arbitrage
equation:
qt
pt
=  t+1
✓
qt+1
pt+1
+ dt+1
◆
(5)
The value of a unit of land today in terms of consumption good equals the discounted
value of the reselling relative price tomorrow and the amount of consumption good delivered
by the unit. Because of condition (5), dividends become endogenous. The role of land is
captured by the sequence of dividends at the end and equation (5) can be viewed either as
an asset-pricing or a non-arbitrage condition.
Inequalities (4) entail that any land dividend is bounded by the lowest and the highest
marginal productivities: dt 2
⇥
dt, d¯t
⇤
.
Since Qt+1 =  t+1Qt, (5) writes
Qt
qt
pt
= Qt+1
✓
qt+1
pt+1
+ dt+1
◆
Solving forward, we find an intertemporal asset-pricing equation
q0
p0
=
TX
t=1
Qtdt +QT
qT
pT
(6)
which holds for any T   1. This fundamental equation allows us to introduce the notion of
land bubble.
Definition 3 (land bubble). The fundamental value of land is given by FV0 :=
P1
t=1Qtdt.
A land bubble exists if the relative price of land (in terms of consumption good) strictly
exceeds the fundamental value: q0/p0 > FV0.
Here the price of land q0/p0 is decomposed into two parts: the fundamental value FV0
and the bubble term lim
t!1
(Qtqt/pt) which can be viewed as the reselling price of one unit of
land at the infinity.
3.1.1 General results
In the spirit of Montrucchio (2004), Le Van and Pham (2014), we provide a simple charac-
terization of bubble existence.
Proposition 2. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) Land bubbles exist.
(ii) lim
t!1
(Qtqt/pt) > 0.
6
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(iii)
P1
t=1 (ptdt/qt) <1.
Note that this result only requires the asset pricing equation (2). Proposition 2 holds for
any form of production functions, including non-stationary technologies.
Let us consider a particular case where technologies are stationary (Fi,t = Fi for every
i and t). In this case, we have dt   min
i
F 0i (li,t)   min
i
F 0i (L) > 0 for every t and, by
consequence, condition (iii) in Proposition 2 simplifies.
Corollary 1. If technologies are stationary and a land bubble exists, then
P1
t=1 (pt/qt) <1.
In other terms, the existence of land bubbles implies that the relative price of land qt/pt
tends to infinity. However, this property only holds under stationary technologies. We will
readdress this issue in Section 3.2 through an explicit example.
The transversality condition simplifies under our definition of individual discounting.
Lemma 2 (transversality condition). limt!1 (Qi,tli,t+1qt/pt) = 0 for any i.
The structure of discount factors plays also a role in the existence of bubbles.
Proposition 3. If, for any i, the ratio Qt/Qi,t is uniformly bounded from above, then there
is no bubble.
By consequence, a land bubble may arise only if the endogenous discount factors Qi,t
are di↵erent at infinitely many dates. In more standard models of rational bubbles with
exogenous dividends such as Kocherlakota (1992), Huang and Werner (2000), Le Van and
Pham (2014), the heterogeneity of endogenous discount factors vanishes if agents’ borrowing
constraints are no longer binding.
In our paper, the properties of production functions Fi,t plays also an important role in
the heterogeneity of discount factors. Let agents share the same linear technology, that is
Fi,t(X) = ⇠tX for any i and t (Lucas’ tree). In this case, If li,t > 0 for any i and t, the
discount factors turn out to be the same and bubbles are ruled out.
Remark 1. In general, the discount factors may di↵er even if li,t > 0 for any i and t.
Indeed, consider the case where every agent has the same production function but non-linear:
Fi(x) = Ax↵ with ↵ 2 (0, 1). At equilibrium, we have li,t > 0 for any i and t, but the
marginal productivities Al↵ 1i,t and Al
↵ 1
j,t may be di↵erent. This is because of the absence of
financial markets (no agent can borrow).
3.1.2 New concepts of bubbles
The first-order conditions imply
qt
pt
=  i,t+1
✓
qt+1
pt+1
+ di,t+1
◆
(7)
where di,t+1 := F 0i,t+1(li,t+1) + µi,t+1/ ( i,t+1pt+1) can be interpreted as an individual land
dividend for agent i at date t+ 1. Since the individual discount factor  i,t+1 is less than the
factor of the economy  t+1, the individual dividend di,t+1 expected by agent i is greater than
the dividend dt+1 of the economy. Moreover, mini di,t+1 = dt+1.
If we write  i,t+1 = 1/(1+ri,t+1) where ri,t+1 is the expected interest rate by the ith agent
at the date t+ 1, then the asset-pricing equation (7) becomes
qt
pt
(1 + ri,t+1) =
qt+1
pt+1
+ di,t+1
7
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In other words, the relative price of land at date t and its interests equals the sum of the
same price at date t+ 1 and individual land dividends.
The asset-pricing equation (7) shows how the ith agent evaluates the price of land. This
agent buys land today and resells it tomorrow at the price qt+1 after earning di,t+1 units
of consumption good as dividend. She compares the current price with the future gains
discounted at the rate  i,t+1.
Solving recursively (7), we can separate the land price in two parts.
q0
p0
=
TX
t=1
Qi,tdi,t +Qi,T
qT
pT
(8)
(8) leads us to define new concepts of bubbles.
Definition 4 (i - bubble). The individual value of land with respect to agent i is FVi :=P1
t=1Qi,tdi,t. We say that an i - bubble exists if q0/p0 > FVi.
Our concept of i - bubble is closely related to that of bubbles of durable goods and
collateralized assets considered by Araujo et al. (2011). In their terminology, factors Qi,t are
called deflators and multipliers µi,t are called non-pecuniary returns.
We apply the same arguments of Proposition 2.
Proposition 4. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) i - bubbles exist.
(ii) lim
t!1
(Qi,tqt/pt) > 0.
(iii)
P1
t=1 (ptdi,t/qt) <1.
By combining point (ii) of Proposition 4 and Lemma 2 we have the following result.
Lemma 3. If an i - bubble exists, then limt!1 li,t = 0.
In other words, when an agent expects a fundamental value of land strictly less than
its price, she does not buy land in the long run. At equilibrium the land market clearsPm
i=1 li,t = L. As a consequence, Lemma 3 implies that there exists an agent i such that the
individual value of land expected by this agent is equal to the equilibrium price of land.
Proposition 5. There exists an agent i such that an i - bubble is ruled out.
Now, let us bridge the two concepts of bubble and i - bubble.
Proposition 6. 1. If an i - land bubble exists for some agent i, then land bubbles exist
as well.
2. FV0  FVi for any i. Moreover, if FV0 = FVi for any i, then FV0 = FVi = q0/p0 for
any i: there are neither bubbles nor i - bubbles.
Note that the converse of point 1 is not true.3 Point 2 of Proposition 6 is highly intuitive.
Since any agent expects an interest rate which is higher than that of economy, the individual
value of land expected by any agent will be higher than the fundamental value of land.
Interestingly, when any individual value of land coincides with that of economy, both bubble
and individual bubbles are ruled out. However when any individual value of land is identical
but di↵erent from the fundamental value of land, we do not know whether land bubbles are
ruled out.4
3See the example in Section 3.2.
4See Remark 4.
8
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Remark 2. Let B0 := q0/p0   FV0 and Bi := q0/p0   FVi denote the bubble and i - bubble
respectively. We observe that Bi  B0 for every i.
Another concept of bubble, more restrictive, rests also on the notions of individual fun-
damental values.
Definition 5 (strong bubble). We say that a strong bubble exists if the asset price exceeds
any individual value of land, that is q0/p0 > maxi2I FVi
The following result is a direct consequence of Proposition 4.
Proposition 7. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) A strong bubble exists.
(ii) mini2I lim
t!1
(Qi,tqt/pt) > 0.
(iii) maxi2I
P1
t=1 (ptdi,t/qt) <1.
The existence of a strong land bubble entails the existence of an i - bubble for any i.
Nevertheless, Proposition 5 prevents from this possibility and implies a new straightforward
result.
Proposition 8. Strong land bubbles never occur in our model because q0/p0 = maxi2I FVi.
Remark 3. Strong bubbles are ruled out in our framework because of the transversality
conditions: limt!1 (Qi,tli,t+1qt/pt) = 0 for any i. However, in more general frameworks (for
example, when uncertainty takes place as in Araujo et al. (2011) or Araujo et al. (2011)),
the alternative transversality conditions are quite di↵erent and it is not trivial to prove them.
Our concept of strong bubble is related to the notion of speculative bubble in Werner
(2014). He considers an asset bringing exogenous dividends in a model with ambiguity and
defines a fundamental value based on agent’s beliefs as the sum of discounted expected future
dividends weighted by these beliefs. Then, he says that a speculative bubble exists if the asset
price strictly exceeds any agent’s fundamental value.
The readers may wonder why there is room for speculative bubbles a` la Werner (2014)
but not for strong bubbles in infinite-horizon models. It is hard to compare these two results
within di↵erent frameworks (with and without ambiguity). The linearity of utility functions
also matters. We impose Inada condition for utility functions to ensure a strictly positive
individual consumption at equilibrium while Werner (2014) works with linear preferences.
With linear utility functions, a simple non-negativity constraint on consumption ci,t   0 may
be binding. In this case, condition (2) no longer holds and the ratio pt+1 i,t+1/ (pt i,t) may
become higher than the marginal rate of substitution  i =  iu0i(ci,t+1)/u
0
i(ci,t). By conse-
quence, the asset price q0/p0 may exceed
P1
t=1  
t
idi,t, the fundamental value with respect to
the ith agent and strong bubbles may exist at the end.
From a theoretical point of view, the existence of bubbles depends on how we define the
fundamental value of an asset, a somewhat ambiguous concept.
3.2 Example of land bubbles
We consider non-stationary production functions and we provide a constructive example of
bubbly equilibrium. For simplicity, we normalize the price of consumption good to one:
pt = 1 for any t. Focus on an oversimplified economy with two agents A and B and linear
9
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technologies: FA,t(L) = AtL and FB,t(L) = BtL. Preferences are rationalized by a common
logarithmic utility function: uA(x) = uB(x) := ln(x). Finally, agents’ endowments are
supposed to be zero any two periods: eA,2t = eB,2t+1 = 0 for any t, and the supply of land
inelastic: L = 1.
We need the following conditions to verify the first-order conditions and to identify the
discount factors of the economy ( t).5
 A
✓
A2t +
 BeB,2t
1 +  B
◆✓
A2t+1 +
 AeA,2t+1
1 +  A
◆
  B eB,2t
1 +  B
eA,2t+1
1 +  A
(9)
 B
✓
B2t +
 BeB,2t
1 +  
◆✓
B2t 1 +
 AeA,2t 1
1 +  A
◆
  A eB,2t
1 +  B
eA,2t 1
1 +  A
(10)
 A
✓
A2t +
 BeB,2t
1 +  B
◆✓
B2t+1 +
 AeA,2t+1
1 +  A
◆
  B eB,2t
1 +  B
eA,2t+1
1 +  A
(11)
 B
✓
A2t +
 BeB,2t
1 +  
◆✓
B2t 1 +
 AeA,2t 1
1 +  A
◆
  A eB,2t
1 +  B
eA,2t 1
1 +  A
(12)
We will check in Appendix that the sequence of allocations
(cA,2t, cB,2t) = (q2t + A2t, eB,2t   q2t)
(cA,2t+1, cB,2t+1) = (eA,2t+1   q2t+1, q2t+1 + B2t+1)
(lA,2t, lB,2t) = (1, 0)
(lA,2t+1, lB,2t+1) = (0, 1)
and land prices
q2t =
 B
1 +  B
eB,2t and q2t+1 =
 A
1 +  A
eA,2t+1 (13)
form a general equilibrium
 
pt, qt, (ci,t, li,t+1)i2I
 
t
.
The sequence of discount factors is computed:
 2t =
 Au0A(cA,2t)
u0A(cA,2t 1)
and  2t+1 =
 Bu0B(cB,2t+1)
u0B(cB,2t)
It allows us to compute in turn the sequence of dividends:
d2t = A2t, d2t+1 = B2t+1 (14)
and to write eventually an explicit characterization of bubble existence. Indeed, according
to Proposition 2, land bubbles exist if and only if
1X
t=0
dt
qt
=
1X
t=0
A2t
eB,2t
+
1X
t=0
B2t+1
eA,2t+1
<1
In other words, the existence of bubbles requires ”low” dividends.
The intuition is straightforward. In the odd periods (2t+1), agent B has no endowments.
She wants to smooth consumption over time according to her logarithm utility (which satisfies
the Inada conditions), but she can not transfer her wealth from future to this date because
of the borrowing constraint. As a consequence, she accepts to buy land at date 2t at a higher
price: q2t   eB,2t B/ (1 +  B), independent on agents’ productivity. A lower productivity
implies lower dividends and a lower fundamental value of land. As long as dividends tend
to zero, the land price remains higher than this fundamental value.
Let us revisit the characterization of bubble existence under stationary technologies.
5These conditions are satisfied if, for instance,  A =  B :=  , A2t, B2t < eB,2t(1    )/ (1 +  ) and
A2t+1, B2t+1 < eA,2t+1(1   )/ (1 +  ) for any t.
10
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Corollary 2. Assume that At = A > 0 and Bt = B > 0 for any t. Then, land bubbles exist
if and only if
1X
t=0
✓
1
eB,2t
+
1
eA,2t+1
◆
<1
In this example, land bubbles exist if and only if
P1
t=1 1/qt < 1. This elegant charac-
terization also illustrates Corollary 1.
Corollary 3. Assume that eA,2t+1 = eB,2t = e > 0 for any t. Then, land bubbles exist if and
only if
1X
t=0
(A2t + B2t+1) <1
This result is consistent with the example in Bosi et al (2015a) where bubbles in capital
good arise if the sum of capital good returns is finite.
Remark 4 (bubble vs i - bubble). Since limt!1 [ tiu
0
i(ci,t)qt] = 0 for i = A,B, there are
no i - bubbles. However, a land bubble may occur. In this case, any individual value of land
is identical and equals to the equilibrium price but may be strictly higher that the fundamental
value of land.
Land bubbles and prices
Corollary 1 points out a necessary condition for land bubbles under stationary technologies:
land prices must diverge to infinity. In our example, technologies are non-stationary and
the land prices are given by (13). Thus, a land bubble may exist with asset prices either
increasing or decreasing or fluctuating over time. In this respect, we recover and generalize
Weil (1990), an example of bubble with decreasing asset prices. Indeed, his model is a
particular case with At = Bt = 0 for any t   T (land will give no fruits from some date on).
Pure bubbles
If At = Bt = 0 for any t, the fundamental value of land is zero. In this case, a sequence of
positive prices (qt > 0 for any t) is called a pure (land) bubble. It is easy to see that our
example admits an equilibrium with pure bubbles.
Remark 5. In this example, although agents have linear production functions, these func-
tions are di↵erent.
There is a case where the productivity of agent A is higher than that of agent B, i.e.,
A2t+1 > B2t+1, but agent A does not produce at date 2t + 1. For two reasons: (1) agents
are prevented from borrowing, (2) agents’ endowments change over time. Although A has
a higher productivity at date 2t + 1, she has also a higher endowment at this date, but no
endowment at date 2t. So, she may not need to buy land at date 2t to produce and transfer
wealth from date 2t to date 2t + 1. Instead, she sells land at date 2t to buy and consume
consumption good at date 2t. Therefore, agent A may not produce at date 2t + 1 even if
A2t+1 > B2t+1.
3.3 Example of individual land bubbles
Fundamentals of the economy. Consider the example in Section 3.2. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that  A =  B =:  .
11
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We add the third agent: agent D. The utility, the rate of time preference, and the
technologies of agent D are
uD(c) = ln(c),  D =  , FD,t(L) = DtL.
The endowments (eD,t)t and productivities (Dt) of agents D are defined by
 eD,t
eD,t+1
=
qt
qt+1 +Dt+1
=  t+1
where ( t) is determined as in Section 3.2. We see that such sequences (eD,t)t and (Dt) exist.
Indeed, for example, we choose Dt = dt where dt is determined as in (14). Then, we choose
(eD,t)t such that  eD,t =  t+1eD,t+1.
Equilibrium: Prices and allocations of agents A and B are as in Section 3.2. The allocations
of agent D are cD,t = eD,t and lD,t = 0 for any t. By using the same argument in Section
3.2, it is easy to verify that this system of prices and allocations constitutes an equilibrium.
We observe that agent D does not trade and  D,t =  eD,t 1/eD,t =  t for any t. By
consequence, limt!1QD,tqt = limt!1Qtqt > 0. There is a D - bubble, i.e. the equilibrium
price of land is strictly higher than the individual value of land with respect to agent D.
Remark 6. In the spirit of this example, we may provide other examples of bubbles with
other production functions, for example Fi,t(x) = ai,tln(1 + x) where ai,t > 0.
4 Housing bubbles
Houses are di↵erent kind of assets. While land is a production factor, houses are consumption
goods. While the former is valued through the production function, the latter are priced
through a consumption demand. To formalize and understand asset pricing and bubbles in
the case of a housing market, we consider a simple two-good economy with consumption and
housing whose prices are pt and qt at date t respectively. Household i is endowed with hi,0
houses at the initial date and ei,t units of consumption good at any date t. For simplicity, we
consider a separable utility function: ui(ci,t)+vi,t(hi,t) where ui is the consumption utility and
vi,t the housing utility function which is assumed to be concave. Without loss of generality,
the consumption utility is supposed to be stationary.
Houses are traded every period as follows. The agent i buys hi,t units of house at date
t  1. At date t, she enjoys the house services, that is a utility vi,t(hi,t), and resells her house
at price qt. Under the assumption of non-stationary housing utility, we obtain more general
results on asset pricing and characterization of bubble.
Taking the sequence of prices (p, q) = (pt, qt)1t=0 as given, each household i chooses the
sequence of goods (ci, hi) := (ci,t, hi,t)1t=0 and solves a program to maximize her intertemporal
utility function:
Ri(p, q) : max
1X
t=0
 ti [ui(ci,t) + vi,t(hi,t)]
subject to : hi,t+1   0
ptci,t + qthi,t+1  ptei,t + qthi,t
for any t.
Definition 6. A list of prices and quantities
⇣
p¯t, q¯t, (c¯i,t, h¯i,t+1)mi=1
⌘1
t=0
is an equilibrium of
the economy without financial markets under the following conditions.
12
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(i) Price positivity: p¯t, q¯t > 0 for any t   0.
(ii) Market clearing conditions:
Pm
i=1 c¯i,t =
Pm
i=1 ei,t and
Pm
i=1 h¯i,t = H for any t   0.
(iii) Agents’ optimality: for any i, (c¯i,t, h¯i,t+1)1t=0 is a solution of program Ri(p¯, q¯).
In the sequel, we denote for simplicity the equilibrium sequence by (p, q, (ci, hi)mi=1). It is
easy to prove the existence of reduced multipliers ⌫i,t+1   0 such that the slackness condition
⌫i,t+1hi,t+1 = 0 and the asset-pricing (no-arbitrage) condition
qt
pt
=
 iu0i(ci,t+1)
u0i(ci,t)

qt+1
pt+1
+
v0i,t(hi,t+1)
u0i(ci,t+1)
+ ⌫i,t+1
 
hold.
As above, we introduce the transition discount factors (individual and maximal) from
time t to time t+ 1:
 i,t+1 :=
 iu0i(ci,t+1)
u0i(ci,t)
and  t+1 := max
i2I
 iu0i(ci,t+1)
u0i(ci,t)
and the corresponding compound discount factors: Qi,t :=  i,1 · · ·  i,t and Qt :=  1 · · ·  t,
with Qi,0 := Q0 := 1.
As above, the transversality condition involves quantities and prices.
Lemma 4. limt!1 (Qi,thi,t+1qt/pt) = 0 for any i.
Similarly to Lemma 1, the lowest and the highest marginal rates of substitution between
consumption and housing drive the asset pricing:
 t+1
✓
qt+1
pt+1
+ dt+1
◆
 qt
pt
  t+1
✓
qt+1
pt+1
+ d¯t+1
◆
where
dt+1 := min
i2I
v0i,t+1(hi,t+1)
u0i(ci,t+1)
and d¯t+1 := max
i2I
v0i,t+1(hi,t+1)
u0i(ci,t+1)
We are naturally leaded to introduce the housing dividend dt and the individual housing
dividend di,t through the asset-pricing equation
qt
pt
=  t+1
✓
qt+1
pt+1
+ dt+1
◆
Equivalently, we define the individual housing dividend di,t of agent i as follows:
di,t+1 :=
v0i,t+1(hi,t+1)
u0i(ci,t+1)
+ ⌫i,t+1
4.1 Fundamental value of housing and housing bubbles
Land and housing are assets of di↵erent nature. Land dividends are determined by the
marginal productivities while housing dividends are determined by marginal utilities. By
the way, our model of housing is related to the money-in-utility-function model by Tirole
(1985). These models di↵er in two main respects: (1) we study infinite-lived agents instead
of overlapping generations and (2) Tirole’s utility function depends on money prices.
In the spirit of Section 3, we introduce new concepts of housing bubbles.
13
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Definition 7 (housing bubble). The fundamental value of a house is defined by FV0 :=P1
t=1Qtdt. We say that housing bubbles exist if the market price of houses (in term of
consumption good) exceeds the fundamental value, that is q0/p0 > FV0.
Definition 8 (individual housing bubble). The individual value of a house with respect
to the agent i is defined by FVi :=
P1
t=1Qi,tdi,t.
We say that an i - housing bubble exists if q0/p0 > FVi.
We say that a strong housing bubble exists if q0/p0 > maxi FVi.
Results of Propositions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 also hold for housing bubbles.
4.2 Example of housing bubbles
A constructive example illustrates the emergence of housing bubbles. Consider an economy
with two agents A and B whose preferences are logarithmic with respect to consumption:
uA(x) = uB(x) := ln(x); non-stationary and linear with respect to housing: vA,t(h) = Ath
and vB,t(h) = Bth. For simplicity, the supply of houses is inelastic: H = 1. Endowments
fluctuate: for any t, eA,2t = eB,2t+1 = 0 and eA,2t+1, eB,2t > 0. We normalize the consumption
prices (pt = 1 for any t) and we construct an equilibrium sequence
 
pt, qt, (ci,t, hi,t+1)i2I
 
t
.
The sequence of equilibrium allocations is given by
(cA,2t, cB,2t) = (q2t, eB,2t   q2t)
(cA,2t+1, cB,2t+1) = (eA,2t+1   q2t+1, q2t+1)
(hA,2t, hB,2t) = (1, 0)
(hA,2t+1, hB,2t+1) = (0, 1)
with prices:
q2t =
 B(1 +B2t+1)
1 +  B(1 +B2t+1)
eB,2t and q2t 1 =
 A(1 + A2t)
1 +  A(1 + A2t)
eA,2t 1
The first-order conditions rest on two restrictions: 1    BB2t +  2B(1 + B2t+1) and
1    AA2t 1 +  2A(1 + A2t). Moreover, inequalities 1    2A(1 + A2t)(1 + B2t 1) and 1  
 2B(1+A2t)(1+B2t+1) imply the inequalities  B,2t+1    A,2t+1 and  A,2t    B,2t under which
the above sequence of allocations turns out to be an equilibrium sequence. It is easy to
compute the discount factors of the economy
 2t+1 =
 Bu0B(cB,2t+1)
u0B(cB,2t)
and  2t =
 Au0A(cA,2t)
u0A(cA,2t 1)
as well as the equilibrium dividends: d2t = A2tcA,2t and d2t+1 = B2t+1cB,2t+1.
The characterization of Proposition 2 applies: housing bubbles exist if and only if
1X
t=0
dt
qt
=
1X
t=0
(A2t + B2t+1) <1
Our example points out the possibility of housing bubble when individual endowments
fluctuate over time and the housing preference rates At and Bt converges to zero.
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5 A unified framework
So far, we see that both the models presented above share a common approach. We may
introduce an asset (with fixed supply G) which is not only used to produce but also gives
utility for agents. In this case, taking the sequence of prices (p, q) = (pt, qt)1t=0 as given, each
household i chooses the sequence of allocations (ci, ai) := (ci,t, ai,t)1t=0 and solves a program
to maximize her intertemporal utility function:
Si(p, q) : max
1X
t=0
 ti [ui(ci,t) + vi,t(ai,t)]
subject to : ai,t+1   0
ptci,t + qtai,t+1  ptei,t + qtai,t + ptFi,t(ai,t)
Definition 9. A list of prices and quantities
⇣
p¯t, q¯t, (c¯i,t, a¯i,t+1)mi=1
⌘1
t=0
is an equilibrium of
the economy without financial markets under the following conditions.
(i) Price positivity: p¯t, q¯t > 0 for any t   0.
(ii) Market clearing conditions:
Pm
i=1 c¯i,t =
Pm
i=1
 
ei,t + Fi,t(a¯i,t)
 
and
Pm
i=1 a¯i,t = G for
any t   0.
(iii) Agents’ optimality: for any i, (c¯i,t, a¯i,t+1)1t=0 is a solution of program Si(p¯, q¯).
In the sequel, we denote for simplicity the equilibrium sequence by (p, q, (ci, ai)mi=1). It is
easy to prove the existence of reduced multipliers xi,t+1   0 such that the slackness condition
xi,t+1ai,t+1 = 0 and the asset-pricing (no-arbitrage) condition
qt
pt
=
 iu0i(ci,t+1)
u0i(ci,t)

qt+1
pt+1
+
v0i,t(ai,t+1)
u0i(ci,t+1)
+ F 0i,t+1(ai,t+1) + xi,t+1
 
(15)
As above, we introduce the transition discount factors (individual and maximal) from
time t to time t+ 1:
 i,t+1 :=
 iu0i(ci,t+1)
u0i(ci,t)
and  t+1 := max
i2I
 iu0i(ci,t+1)
u0i(ci,t)
and the corresponding compound discount factors: Qi,t :=  i,1 · · ·  i,t and Qt :=  1 · · ·  t,
with Qi,0 := Q0 := 1.
Transversality conditions still hold
Lemma 5. limt!1 (Qi,tai,t+1qt/pt) = 0 for any i.
For each t, individual dividend di,t of agent i is defined by:
di,t :=
v0i,t(ai,t)
u0i(ci,t)
+ F 0i,t(ai,t) + xi,t
We then define the sequence of dividends (dt) through the asset-pricing equation
qt
pt
=  t+1
✓
qt+1
pt+1
+ dt+1
◆
15
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It is easy to see that dt 2 [dt, d¯t], where
dt := min
i2I
nv0i,t(ai,t)
u0i(ci,t)
+ F 0i,t(ai,t)
o
and d¯t := max
i2I
nv0i,t(ai,t)
u0i(ci,t)
+ F 0i,t(ai,t)
o
By using the approaches in Sections 3 and 4, we can obtain similar results (about bubbles,
individual bubbles, and strong bubbles) as the ones with land and house. The di↵erence here
is that the endogenous dividends in this general model take into account both roles of the
asset: input and utility.
6 Conclusion and further discussions
We have introduced di↵erent concepts of land and housing bubbles, including individual
and strong bubbles. While strong bubbles never occur in our model, bubbles may exist but
they are ruled out if agents’ expected values coincide with the fundamental value of land.
Interestingly, there is always an agent whose expected value of land equals the land equi-
librium price. Some explicit examples of bubbles are provided to illustrate these theoretical
outcomes. Land bubbles may arise when agents experience endowment fluctuations and the
ratio between fruits of land and endowments tends to zero. Similarly, housing bubbles may
arise if the endowments fluctuate and the housing preference rate converges to zero.
Further discussions (bubbles and e ciency)
Although the results on land and house bubbles are quite similar, we would like to point out
that di↵erent assets may generate very di↵erent bubbles. Readers are referred to Bosi et al
(2015a) where they show that bubbles of capita good are ruled out if borrowing constraints of
agents are not binding while bubbles of aggregate good may appear even when the financial
market is perfect.
Another interesting issue is the connection between the existence of bubbles and the
e ciency.
First, let us discuss about pure bubbles, i.e., bubbles in the asset which pays no dividend.
There is a large literature on this kind of bubble and most of papers focus on OLG frame-
works. In a standard OLG model of bubbles, Tirole (1985) shows that a pure bubble may
occur only if the economy is ine cient.6 However, Farhi and Tirole (2012) points out that
with imperfect capital markets, bubbles are possible even when the economy is e cient.
Second, we discuss the connection between physical capital bubble (Becker et al., 2015)
and the e ciency of Ramsey equilibrium.7 In an infinite-horizon model with stationary
technologies, Becker et al. (2015) prove that physical capital bubbles are ruled out. In a
similar framework, Becker et al. (2014) provide an example where a three-cycle equilibrium
is ine cient. One can prove that there is no physical capital bubble in Becker et al. (2014).
This shows that an ine cient bubbleless equilibrium may exist.
With non-stationary technologies, Bosi et al (2015a) give an example where equilibrium is
e cient and bubbles occur, and another example where equilibrium is e cient and bubbles
are ruled out. These examples suggest that there is no causal relationship between the
existence of physical capital bubble and the e ciency of Ramsey equilibrium.
6According to Tirole (1985), an allocation is e cient if it is not possible to improve the welfare of all
generations (and, this, strictly for at least one of them).
7A Ramsey equilibrium is e cient if its capital path is e cient in the sense of Malinvaud (1953).
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Let us now come back to our framework. The question about the (constrained) e ciency
in infinite-horizon general equilibrium models is matter of a long debate. Until now, we
didn’t provide a general su cient condition for the ine ciency of equilibria.
If we define the e ciency of equilibrium in terms of equilibrium capital paths, we may use
Cass (1972) where he gives a necessary and su cient condition for the e ciency of capital
paths. However, Cass (1972) considers only the capital paths (with a single technology) that
are bounded away from zero.
In this respect, we raise two issues and leave them for future research: (1) checking
whether any equilibrium in our framework is e cient, (2) bridging the existence of land
bubble and the e ciency of equilibrium. In order to solve these fundamental problems, we
may use the methods introduced by Cass (1972) and Balasko and Shell (1980).8
7 Appendix: Proofs for Sections 3 and 4
Proof of Lemma 2. limt!1 (Qi,tli,t+1qt/pt) = 0 and limt!1
⇥
 tiu
0
i(ci,t)li,t+1qt/pt
⇤
= 0 are equiv-
alent. We say that li is feasible if, for every t, li,t   0 and qtli,t+1  ptei,t + qtli,t + ptFi(li,t).
Note that if li is feasible then (li,0, li,1, . . . , li,t 1, li,t, li,t+1, . . .) is also feasible for each t   1 and
  2 (0, 1). By using the same argument in the proof of Theorem 2.1 by Kamihigashi (2002), we
obtain limt!1
⇥
 tiu
0
i(ci,t)li,t+1qt/pt
⇤
= 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. According to (6), a bubble exists if and only if limT!1QT qT /pT > 0.
According to (5), we have
Qt
qt
pt
= Qt+1
qt+1
pt+1
✓
1 +
pt+1
qt+1
dt+1
◆
for any t. By consequence,
q0
p0
= Q1
q1
p1
✓
1 +
p1
q1
d1
◆
= · · · = QT qTpT
✓
1 +
pT
qT
dT
◆
. . .
✓
1 +
p1
q1
d1
◆
So, limT!1QT qT /pT > 0 if and only if
lim
T!1
✓
1 +
pT
qT
dT
◆
. . .
✓
1 +
p1
q1
d1
◆ 
<1
or, equivalently,
P1
t=1 (ptdt/qt) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume that Qt/Qi,t is uniformly bounded from above. According to
Lemma 2, we have
lim
t!1
✓
Qt
qt
pt
li,t+1
◆
= lim
t!1
✓
Qt
Qi,t
Qi,t
qt
pt
li,t+1
◆
= 0
for any i. Observing that
P
i2I li,t+1 = L for any t, we obtain limt!1 (Qtqt/pt) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 6. Qt   Qi,t implies limt!1 (Qtqt/pt)   limt!1 (Qi,tqt/pt). However, we
have FVi + limt!1 (Qi,tqt/pt) = q0/p0 = FV0 + limt!1 (Qtqt/pt). By consequence, we get FV0 
FVi for any i. Therefore, if i - land bubbles exist for some agent i then land bubbles exist.
We now assume that FV0 = FVi for any i, which implies limt!1 (Qtqt/pt) = limt!1 (Qi,tqt/pt).
If land bubbles exist, then
lim
t!1
✓
Qt
qt
pt
◆
= lim
t!1
✓
Qi,t
qt
pt
◆
2 (0, q0
p0
)
Thus, we find limt!1 (Qi,t/Qt) = 1. We obtain limt!1 (Qtqt/pt) = 0 according to Proposition
3.
8 We observe that (1) Balasko and Shell (1980) consider OLG models and (2) the technique introduced
by Cass (1972) doesn’t apply directly to a framework with many producers as ours.
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Lemma 6. If a sequence
 
pt, qt, (ci,t, li,t+1, µi,t)i2I
 
t
satisfies:
(i) positivity of prices (pt = 1 and qt > 0 for any t) and non-negativity of allocations and
multipliers (ci,t > 0, li,t+1 > 0 and µi,t > 0 for any i and t);
(ii) asset-pricing conditions
qt =
 iu0i(ci,t+1)
u0i(ci,t)
⇥
qt+1 + F
0
i,t(li,t+1)
⇤
+ µi,t+1 (16)
and slackness conditions µi,t+1li,t+1 = 0 for any i and t;
(iii) transversality conditions: limt!1
⇥
 tiu
0
i(ci,t)qtli,t+1
⇤
= 0 for any i;
(iv) budget constraints: ci,t + qtli,t+1 = ei,t + qtli,t + Fi,t(li,t) for any i and t;
(vi) market clearing: L =
P
i2I li,t for any t;
then, the sequence of prices and allocations
 
pt, qt, (ci,t, li,t+1)i2I
 
t
is an equilibrium for the
economy with land.
Proof of Lemma 6. It is easy to see that market clearing conditions are satisfied. We now prove
the optimality of the agents’ plan. Let (c0i, l0i)   0 be a plan satisfying all the budget constraints
and l0i,0 = li,0. We have
 T :=
TX
t=0
 ti
⇥
ui(ci,t)  ui(c0i,t)
⇤   TX
t=0
 tiu
0
i(ci,t)(ci,t   c0i,t)
=
TX
t=0
 tiu
0
i(ci,t)
⇥
qt(li,t   l0i,t) + Fi,t(li,t)  Fi,t(l0i,t)  qt(li,t+1   l0i,t+1)
⇤
 
TX
t=0
 tiu
0
i(ci,t)
⇥
qt + F
0
i,t(li,t)
⇤
(li,t   l0i,t) 
TX
t=0
 tiu
0
i(ci,t)qt(li,t+1   l0i,t+1)
=
TX
t=1
 
 tiu
0
i(ci,t)
⇥
qt + F
0
i,t(li,t)
⇤   t 1i u0i(ci,t 1)qt 1  (li,t   l0i,t)
   Ti u0i(ci,T )qT (li,T+1   l0i,T+1).
We obtain  tiu
0
i(ci,t)
h
qt + F 0i,t(li,t)
i
   t 1i u0i(ci,t 1)qt 1 =  µi,t t 1i u0i(ci,t 1) according to (16).
By using this and the fact that µi,tli,t = 0 for any t, we have
 T    
TX
t=1
µi,t 
t 1
i u
0
i(ci,t 1)(li,t   l0i,t) +  Ti u0i(ci,T )qT (l0i,T+1   li,T+1)
=
TX
t=1
 t 1i u
0
i(ci,t 1)µi,tl
0
i,t +  
T
i u
0
i(ci,T )qT (l
0
i,T+1   li,T+1)
    Ti u0i(ci,T )qT li,T+1.P1
t=0  
t
iui(ci,t) <1 and limt!1
⇥
 Ti u
0
i(ci,T )qT li,T+1
⇤
= 0 entail that the sum
P1
t=0  
t
iui(c
0
i,t) is
finite. Therefore, we get
P1
t=0  
t
iui(ci,t)  
P1
t=0  
t
iui(c
0
i,t).
Proof for the example in Section 3.2. It is easy to see that the market clearing conditions are sat-
isfied.
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We check the first-order conditions:
q2t =
 Bu0B(cB,2t+1)
u0B(cB,2t)
(q2t+1 +B2t+1)    Au
0
A(cA,2t+1)
u0A(cA,2t)
(q2t+1 +A2t+1) (17)
q2t 1 =
 Au0A(cA,2t)
u0A(cA,2t 1)
(q2t +A2t)    Bu
0
B(cB,2t)
u0B(cB,2t 1)
(q2t +B2t) (18)
The equality in (17) holds because
 Bu0B(cB,2t+1)
u0B(cB,2t)
(q2t+1 +B2t+1) =
 B(eB,2t   q2t)
q2t+1 +B2t+1
(q2t+1 +B2t+1)
=  B(eB,2t   q2t) = q2t
Now, we prove the inequality in (17). We have
 Au0A(cA,2t+1)
u0A(cA,2t)
(q2t+1 +A2t+1) =
 A(q2t +A2t)
eA,2t+1   q2t+1 (q2t+1 +A2t+1)
=
 A(
 B
1+ B
eB,2t +A2t)
1
1+ A
eA,2t+1
✓
 A
1 +  A
eA,2t+1 +A2t+1
◆
By consequence, the inequality in (17) is equivalent to
 A(
 BeB,2t
1 +  B
+A2t)(
 AeA,2t+1
1 +  A
+A2t+1)   B eB,2t1 +  B
eA,2t+1
1 +  A
that is (9).
We have
 Bu0B(cB,2t)
u0B(cB,2t 1)
(q2t +B2t) =
 B(q2t 1 +B2t 1)
eB,2t   q2t (q2t +B2t)
=
 B(
 A
1+ A
eA,2t 1 +B2t 1)
1
1+ B
eB,2t
✓
 B
1 +  B
eB,2t +B2t
◆
By consequence, the inequality in (18) is equivalent to
 B
✓
 AeA,2t 1
1 +  A
+B2t 1
◆✓
 BeB,2t
1 +  
+B2t
◆
  A eB,2t1 +  B
eA,2t 1
1 +  A
that is (10).
We now check the transversality conditions:
 2tA u
0
A(cA,2t)q2tlA,2t+1 = 0
 2t 1A u
0
A(cA,2t 1)q2t 1lA,2t =
 2t 1A
cA,2t 1
q2t 1 =
1
1 +  A
 2tA ! 0
Similarly,
 2tB u
0
B(cB,2t)q2tlB,2t+1 =
1
1 +  B
 2t+1B ! 0
 2t 1B u
0
B(cB,2t 1)q2t 1lB,2t = 0
Finally, it is easy to see that conditions (11) and (12) imply
 2t =
 Au0A(cA,2t)
u0A(cA,2t 1)
   Bu
0
B(cB,2t)
u0B(cB,2t 1)
 2t+1 =
 Bu0B(cB,2t+1)
u0B(cB,2t)
   Au
0
A(cA,2t+1)
u0A(cA,2t)
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The result of Lemma 6 also holds for housing.
Lemma 7 (su cient equilibrium condition in housing economies). If a sequence 
pt, qt, (ci,t, hi,t+1, ⌫i,t)i2I
 
t
satisfies:
(i) positivity of prices (pt = 1 and qt > 0 for any t) and non-negativity of allocations and
multipliers (ci,t > 0, hi,t+1 > 0 and ⌫i,t > 0 for any i and t);
(ii) asset-pricing conditions
qt =
 iu0i(ci,t+1)
u0i(ci,t)

qt+1 +
v0i,t+1(hi,t+1)
u0i(ci,t+1)
 
+ ⌫i,t+1
and slackness conditions ⌫i,t+1hi,t+1 = 0 for any i and t;
(iii) transversality conditions: limt!1
⇥
 tiu
0
i(ci,t)qthi,t+1
⇤
= 0 for any i;
(iv) budget constraints: ci,t + qthi,t+1 = ei,t + qthi,t for any i and t;
(vi) market clearing:
P
i2I Hi,t = H for any t;
then, the sequence of prices and allocations
 
pt, qt, (ci,t, hi,t+1)i2I
 
t
is an equilibrium for the
housing economy.
8 Existence of equilibrium
We adapt the proofs of Becker et al. (2015) and Le Van and Pham (2015). We consider non-
stationary production functions Fi,t depending on t.
Existence of equilibrium in a truncated economy
We define a T - truncated economy ET as E but without activities from period T + 1 on, that
is we set ci,t = li,t = 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m and t   T + 1.
Then, we define a bounded economy ETb as ET but sequences of consumption (ci,t)Tt=0 and land
holdings (li,t)Tt=1 lie in the following bounded sets Ci := [0, Bc]T+1 and Li := [0, Bl]T respectively,
with Bc > maxtT
Pm
i=1 [ei,t + Fi,t(Bl)] and Bl > L. Therefore, the economy ETb depends on bounds
Bc and Bl. We write ETb (Bc, Bl).
Let us denote Xb := Ci ⇥ Li and X := (Xb)T+1, and define
P := {z0 = (p, q) : qT = 0; pt, qt   0; pt + qt = 1; t = 0, . . . , T}
  := P ⇥ X
An element z 2   is a list z = (zi)mi=0 with z0 := (p, q) and zi := (ci, li) for each i = 1, . . . ,m.
Remark 7. If z 2   is an equilibrium for the economy E then ci,t 2 [0, Bc), li,t 2 [0, L].
Proposition 9. Under our assumptions, there exists an equilibrium (p, q, (ci, li)mi=1) with pt+qt = 1
for the economy ETb (Bc, Bl).
Proof. We introduce the budget sets:
CTi (p, q) :=
 
(ci,t, li,t+1)
T
t=0 2 X : li,T+1, bi,T+1 = 0,
ptci,t + qtli,t+1  ptei,t + ptFi,t(li,t) + qtli,t8t
 
BTi (p, q) :=
 
(ci,t, li,t+1)
T
t=0 2 X : li,T+1, bi,T+1 = 0,
ptci,t + qtli,t+1 < ptei,t + ptFi,t(li,t) + qtli,t8t
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Since ei,0, li,0 > 0 and (p0, q0) 6= (0, 0), we always have p0ei,0 + p0Fi,0(li,0) + q0li,0 > 0. By
consequence, BTi (p, q) 6= ; and B¯Ti (p, q) = CTi (p, q).
Since BTi (p, q) is nonempty and has an open graph, B
T
i (p, q) is lower semi-continuous corre-
spondence on P. And we also have CTi (p, q) is continuous on P with compact convex values.
We introduce the correspondences. We define '0 (for additional agent 0) : X ! 2P :
'0((zi)
m
i=1) := arg max
(p,q)2P
 
TX
t=0
pt
mX
i=1
[ci,t   ei,t   Fi,t(li,t)] +
T 1X
t=0
qt
mX
i=1
(li,t+1   li,t)
!
For i = 1, . . . ,m, we define 'i : P ! 2X :
'i((p, q)) := arg max
(ci,li)2Ci(p,q)
TX
t=0
 tiui(ci,t)
The correspondence 'i is upper semi-continuous, non-empty, convex and compact-valued for each
i = 0, . . . ,m + 1. According to the Kakutani Theorem, there exists (p¯, q¯, (c¯i, l¯i)mi=1) such that
(p¯, q¯) 2 '0((c¯i, l¯i)mi=1) and (c¯i, l¯i) 2 'i((p¯, q¯)).
It is easy to prove that (p¯, q¯, (c¯i, l¯i)mi=1) is an equilibrium for the economy ETb .
We apply the argument of Lemma 3 in Le Van and Pham (2015) to prove the existence of
equilibrium in unbounded truncated economies.
Proposition 10. An equilibrium (p, q, (ci, li)mi=1), with pt+ qt = 1, of ETb is an equilibrium for ET .
Existence of equilibrium in an infinite-horizon economy
Proposition 11. Under Assumptions 1 to 4, there exists an equilibrium in the economy E.
Proof. We have shown that there exists an equilibrium, say
 
pT , qT ,
 
cTi , l
T
i
 
i
 
, for each truncated
economy ET . Recall that pTt + qTt = 1. It is clear that, for each t, we have cTi,t 2 (0,Wt); lTi,t 2 [0, L];
pTt , q
T
t 2 [0, 1]. Therefore, without loss of generality, we can assume that
 
pT , qT ,
 
cTi , l
T
i
 
i
  T!1 !
(p, q, (ci, li)i) (for the product topology).
Applying the same argument in the proof of Theorem 1 by Le Van and Pham (2015) or the proof
of Theorem 1 by Le Van, Pham, and Vailakis (2014), we obtain that (p, q, (ci, li)i) is an equilibrium
for the economy E .
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